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H.: Abstracts of Recent Cases

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
tors not usually considered in compensation cases. No one would
advocate denying compensable claims; however, attempts to make
all claims compensable regardless of how remotely connected with
employment should be condemned.

J.J.P.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
CONSTrrTUTONAL LAW-DLGAaTiON OF PowER-ScnooL
TAx oN RECORnATON OF

Bomu

INsTRumEs.-The clerk of the county

court refused to admit petitioners' deed to record, unless petitioners
paid an additional fee which the clerk asserted was due by virtue
of an ordinance adopted by the county board of education. The
state legislature had delegated to the boards of education the power
to impose by ordinance a recording fee for county school fund purposes. The state constitution gave the legislature the power to provide for the support of free schools and for raising funds therefor in
each county, by authority of the people thereof. Petitioners applied
for a writ of mandamus to require the clerk to record the deed.
Held, mandamus granted. An act which delegates to county boards
of education the power to impose taxes upon the recordation of
instruments is unconstitutional under W. VA. CONST. art. 5, § 1, relating to separation of power, and art. 12, § 5, concerning the responsibility of the legislature for the support of free schools. State
ex rel. Winter v. Brown, 103 S.E.2d 892 (W. Va. 1958).
In West Virginia the right of the legislature to delegate taxing
power to school boards must be based upon a state constitutional
provision. A board of education may exercise the taxing power
only under a delegation by the legislature which does not contravene
the constitution. The validity of this delegated taxing power of the
boards of education was expressly made contingent upon a favorable
majority vote of the people of the county. This decision, however,
does not impair the power and authority of county boards of education to levy taxes for the support of free schools. For further discussion and cases see: 47 Am. Jum. Schools § 78 (1948); 51 Am. Jir.
Taxation § 144 (1944); 11 Am. Jtmr. Constitutional Law § 223
(1937); Amot, 113 A.L.R. 1416 (1988). See also, Warden v. County
Court, 116 W. Va. 695, 183 S.E. 89 (1935).
A. G. H.
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-Petitioner met a government informer at a doctor's office where apparently both were receiving treatment for narcotics addiction. Informer requested petitioner to supply him with narcotics because he
was not responding to treatment. After a number of requests, based
on the informer's presumed suffering, petitioner obtained narcotics
and sold them to the informer on several occasions. Informer reported the incidents to the narcotics bureau. On informer's evidence, petitioner was convicted of illegal sale of narcotics in a federal
district court and his conviction was affirmed by the court of appeals,
United States v. Sherman, 240 F.2d 949 (2d Cir. 1957). On certiorari, held, that the evidence established entrapment, necessitating
reversal and dismissal of indictment. Sherman v. United States, 78
Sup. Ct. 819 (1958).
In so holding the Supreme Court adhered to well established principles by which the defense of entrapment had been firmly recognized in federal courts. The Court will not sustain a conviction
procured by police methods through which criminal intent, originating in the minds of government officers, was implanted into the mind
of an innocent person. The inducement of an innocent person to
commit a crime, as means of obtaining evidence for prosecution
therefor, constitutes an abuse of the function of law enforcement and
a conviction so procured will not be permitted to stand. See, Sorrells
v. United States, 287 U.S. 485 (1932). For further discussion and
cases see, 15 Am. Jur. CriminalLaw §§ 335, 336 (1938); Annot., 86
A.L.R. 263 (1933).
A. G. H.

WmTNWSSEs-CRoss-ExAMIAToN-WAIVER

OF

S3AF-INWCMVN-

PmIvriGE y DEmANT WHO TEsmms IN HIs OwN BmALr.
-A suit for denaturalization was brought against petitioner. At the
trial petitioner took the stand in her own behalf and stated that she
had not engaged in any Communist activities for ten years prior to
her naturalization. On cross-examination the government asked petitioner questions relating to her Communist activities which she refused to answer, claiming the privilege against self-incrimination.
The district court ruled that petitioner had abandoned the privilege
and directed her to answer. She persistently refused to answer and
was sentenced to imprisonment for contempt of court. Conviction
was affirmed by the court of appeals. Brown v. United States, 234
ATioN
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F.2d 140 (6th Cir. 1956). Held, that where a witness took the stand
voluntarily and testified in her own behalf, she waived, on crossexamination, the privilege against self-incrimination concerning matters made relevant by her direct examination. Brown v. United
States, 78 Sup. Ct. 622 (1958).
The majority of the Court in this five-to-four decision, as pointed
out in the strong dissents, has in effect extended the rule of waiver
in criminal proceedings to the trial of civil cases. The party has an
opportunity at the outset to weigh advantages of his self-incriminating privilege against the benefit of testifying. When the witness
testifies, however, the Court will not permit him to give testimony in
his favor and, on cross-examination, invoke a constitutional privilege
to avoid answering questions made relevant by his direct examination.
The witness thus lays himself open to disclose all facts relevant to
the matters in evidence by his own direct testimony. For further discussion and cases see: 58 Am. Jtu. Witnesses §§ 94, 95 (1948);
Annot., 147 A.L.R. 255 (1943); 8 WiGmoBe, EvIENcE § 2276 (3d ed.
1940).
A. G. H.

EVIDmNcE-CmMINAL LAw-WmH

NEWLY Discovmmu

EviENcE

Nor BAsis FOR NEw TRrI.-X and a companion, both intoxicated,
became involved in an argument in a tavern in which D was a bartender. 1), armed with a revolver, encountered X at the doorway of
the tavern and fired a shot which killed X. D claimed he shot in selfdefense when X brandished a knife. The knife which D claimed was
brandished could not be found and its existence was not established
by the testimony of witnesses. D was convicted of second degree
murder. Later D learned that an eyewitness had removed the knife
from the scene and D, in support of his motion for a new trial, filed
affidavits setting forth facts as to newly-discovered evidence. The
trial court denied D's motion for a new trial. Held, that the newly
discovered evidence relating to the knife was not sufficient to entitle
D to a new trial since the admission of such evidence would not have
produced a different result State v. Fraley, 104 S.E.2d 265 (W. Va.
1958).
The court refused to depart from the well established principle
that a new trial on the basis of after-discovered evidence is granted
only under special circumstances. Under the record circumstances
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existing in this case, the introduction of the weapon in evidence in a
subsequent trial could not reasonably have supported a plea of selfdefense which was obviously rejected by the trial jury. The rule
pronounced by the West Virginia court is consistent with the prevailing view. Since "the new evidence is not such evidence as ought
to produce an opposite result upon another trial, it is not sufficient
to entitle the defendant to a new trial." See, State v. Spradley, 140
W. Va. 314, 84 S.E.2d 156 (1954). For a detailed discussion and
cases see, 89 Am. Jum. New Trial § § 165, 166 (1942).
A. G. H.
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